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ScienceDirectThe prefrontal cortex (PFC) subserves decision-making and
executive control. Here we review recent empirical and modeling
works with a focus on neuroimaging studies, which start unifying
these two conceptual approaches of PFC function. We propose
that the PFC comprises two arbitration systems: (1) a peripheral
system comprising premotor/caudal PFC regions and
orbitofrontal regions involved in the selection of actions based on
perceptual cues and reward values, respectively, and embedded
in behavioral sets associated with external contingencies inferred
as being stable; (2) a core system comprising ventromedial,
dorsomedial, lateral and polar PFC regions involved in
superordinate probabilistic reasoning for arbitrating online
between exploiting/adjusting previously learned behavioral sets
and exploring/creating new ones for efficient adaptive behavior in
variable and open-ended environments.
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The prefrontal cortex is often described as subserving
decision-making and executive control. Decision-making
research focuses on the PFC function in action selection
according to perceptual cues and reward values [1,2].
Executive control research focuses on the PFC function
in learning and switching between behavioral rules or sets
that guide action [1,3–10]. These two lines of research have
often been carried out independently. Here we review
recent findings and outline a theoretical framework unify-
ing these two conceptual approaches of PFC function.
From simple decisions to task sets
There is converging evidence that the computation of
expected rewards driving action selection primarilywww.sciencedirect.com involves the ventromedial PFC (vmPFC) [11–13]. The
vmPFC, especially its ventral portion (often referred to as
the medial orbitofrontal cortex), enables to convert dis-
tinct subjective reward scales into a ‘common currency’
scale for allowing value comparison [14–17] that drives
selection. Reward values are generally associated with
action outcomes rather than actions per se. Consistently,
the vmPFC is involved in predicting action outcomes
[18–21,22], suggesting that the vmPFC encodes action-
outcome associations for selecting actions according to
reward values. By contrast, selecting actions according to
perceptual cues involves the lateral premotor cortex
[9,23–25]. However, when expected rewards and percep-
tual cues are not linked to specific actions, decisions are
presumably made between more abstract action sets that
may subsequently guide the selection of specific actions
according to stimuli. In such situations, consistently, both
reward-based and cue-based decisions engage the lateral
prefrontal cortex (lPFC) [26,27], which subserves cogni-
tive control, that is, the formation and selection of such
action sets [3,9,23,24,28–32]. Importantly, abstract action
sets spontaneously develop for controlling action selec-
tion even when their formation provides no immediate
behavioral advantages [28,29]. Thus, lPFC activations
often reported in simple choice tasks suggest that when-
ever possible, subjects build abstract action sets and
primarily choose between these sets for subsequently
selecting simple actions, especially in sequential decision
tasks facilitating the formation of stable sets across trials.
Abstract action sets thus comprise multiple stimulus-
action and (stimulus)-action-outcome associations, which
are learned and continuously adjusted online for max-
imizing rewards. Computational modeling suggest that
stimulus-action and (stimulus)-action-outcome associ-
ations are learned and adjusted through reinforcement
and statistical learning respectively [33,34], while
abstract action sets emerge through probabilistic cluster-
ing processes [29]. Collectively, these flexible representa-
tions invoked together for driving action selection while
the same external situation perpetuates, constitute a
consistent behavioral strategy also referred to as a task
set (Figure 1).
Task sets and adaptive behavior
Task sets are critical executive units for efficient adaptive
behavior in everyday environments featuring external
situations that often change and may reoccur periodicallyCurrent Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2015, 1:101–106
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Prefrontal cortex and structures of executive representations. (A) The frontal lobes comprise the premotor (PM), lateral prefrontal (lPFC) and
frontopolar (FPC) regions on the lateral side (top); on the medial side (bottom), the dorsomedial (dmPFC including the pre-SMA and dACC), the
ventromedial (vmPFC) and orbitofrontal (mOFC) regions. (B) Task-sets are temporal abstraction including action sets which in turn comprise
stimulus-action and action-outcome associations. Color matches across panels and illustrates the anatomical mapping of these executive
representations.and where new situations may always arise. Task sets are
formed and stored as mentally instantiating external
situations for possibly exploiting them when these situ-
ations reoccur [33]. This adaptive capacity requires
continuously arbitrating between exploiting/adjusting pre-
viously learned task sets vs. exploring/creating new ones.
The PFC has likely evolved to make this arbitration
online [35]. The arbitration however is a complex prob-
abilistic reasoning problem, which optimal solution is
actually computationally intractable [33]. Accordingly,
we recently proposed that the core PFC executive systemCurrent Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2015, 1:101–106 comprising the ventromedial, dorsomedial, lateral and
frontopolar PFC regions has primarily evolved as imple-
menting an approximate algorithmic solution to this
problem [35]: the solution especially assumes that the
executive system infers online the absolute reliability of
the current task set driving ongoing behavior (i.e. the actor
task set): this quantity measures the probability that given
external evidence, this task set is still applicable to the
situation or equivalently, that the situation remains
unchanged (considering that the range of external situ-
ation is potentially infinite). The concept of absolutewww.sciencedirect.com
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uncertainty [36] to open-ended environments and is
related to the psychological notion of metacognition
and confidence [37].
The medial PFC: from exploitation to
exploration
We noted above that task sets comprise a forward model
predicting action outcomes, and the vmPFC is likely to
encode the forward model of the actor task set. fMRI
studies further reveal that in reversal learning tasks,
vmPFC activations vary with the probability that the
current situation remains unchanged according to actual
action outcomes [18]. Moreover, we recently observed
that in conditions inducing subjects to build multiple task
sets according to actual action outcomes, vmPFC acti-
vations (along with perigenual anterior cingulate acti-
vations) specifically correlate with the absolute
reliability of the actor task set [38]. These results
provide evidence that the vmPFC is specifically involved
in inferring the actor task-set reliability according to the
consistency between expected and actual action out-
comes. In agreement with this hypothesis, vmPFC acti-
vations were also found to predict subjects’ confidence in
making simple reward-based decisions [37] (Figure 2).
The notion of absolute reliability implies that task sets are
inferred as being either reliable (i.e. more likely applicableFigure 2
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The PFC core executive system and probabilistic reasoning driving
adaptive behavior. See text for details.
www.sciencedirect.com than non-applicable to the current situation) or unreliable
(the converse) [33]. When the actor task set passes from
the reliable to unreliable status, the current external situ-
ation has likely changed. Modeling and behavioral results
show that in that event, subjects switch away from exploit-
ing/adjusting the current actor set and start exploring by
forming a new actor set built upon the collection of task sets
stored in long-term memory [33,38]. fMRI results show
that unlike the vmPFC, the dorsomedial PFC (dmPFC)
comprising the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) and
the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) responds
specifically to this algorithmic transition [38]. Consist-
ently, neuronal recordings confirm that when animals
switch from exploitation to exploration behaviors, neuronal
ensembles in the dmPFC exhibit abrupt activity resetting
[31,40,41]. Additional fMRI results in humans suggest
that in foraging tasks, the dmPFC monitors the opportunity
to switch from exploitation to exploration [42]. Altogether,
these findings suggest that while the vmPFC infers
the actor absolute reliability from action outcomes, the
dmPFC monitors the actor absolute reliability not only for
regulating actor adjustments [39] but especially for detect-
ing when the actor task set becomes unreliable and enforcing
the switch from exploitation to exploration. This discrete,
non-parametric transition consists of inhibiting the ongoing
actor task set for creating a new actor task set driving
behavior. According to electrophysiological recordings
[43–45], the dACC may enforce the transition at the set
level, while the pre-SMA may be involved in inhibiting its
executive elements, that is, action sets and related
stimulus-action associations.
From a normative viewpoint, creating a new task set
consists of mixing the task sets stored in long-term
memory according to current external evidence and
task-set internal models [33,35]: the new task set opti-
mally reuses previous learned situations for driving beha-
vior, when the actor task set becomes unreliable. Current
empirical findings suggest that this creation process
involves the caudal LPFC and premotor cortex along
with basal ganglia [23,38]. Newly created task sets
driving behavior is initially inferred as being unreliable
but through learning (see above), may subsequently
become reliable. fMRI results show the latter event elicits
ventral striatal along with premotor and caudal LPFC
activations. These activations presumably reflect the
consolidation of newly created task sets in long-term
memory when they become reliable [38]. Exploration
behaviors thus consist of creating and learning new task
sets and perpetuate until the medial PFC infers these
new task sets as becoming reliable.
The lateral PFC: from exploration to
exploitation
Behavioral results suggest that humans can infer the
absolute reliability of three or four task sets concurrently
[33,38]: the current actor along with two or threeCurrent Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2015, 1:101–106
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previously inferred as being reliable and used as actor but
no longer reliable. When subjects switch into exploration
as described above, the former actor typically remains
monitored as an alternative task set (which may be
subsequently retrieved, see below). Several fMRI studies
have pointed out the role of the lateral frontopolar PFC
(FPC) in exploration [46–49]. Other fMRI studies show
that the FPC is involved in holding on and monitoring
alternative courses of action [19,20,50]. Recent results
indicate that consistently, FPC activations more specifi-
cally correlate with the absolute reliability of two con-
current alternative task sets [38]. The FPC thus appears
to keep track and infer the absolute reliability of a few
alternative task sets, which notably occur during explora-
tion periods (Figure 2).
Such alternative task sets make no contribution to
ongoing behavior but may be subsequently retrieved
for driving behavior [33,38]: As two task sets cannot
be judged as being reliable simultaneously, any alterna-
tive task set becoming reliable is retrieved and replaces
the current actor task set. This retrieval process enables
the organism to switch out of exploration periods by
rejecting newly created task sets. The retrieval process
also enables exploration periods to be skipped by directly
switching to an alternative task set, when the ongoing
actor task set becomes unreliable. fMRI data show that
consistent with its critical role in task-switching
[12,24,51], the lPFC detects when one alternative task-
set become reliable [38]: the lPFC presumably initiates
the retrieval process that propagates from middle to
caudal lPFC regions [38].
PFC functional architecture and adaptive
behavior
Altogether, these recent findings suggest that the PFC
comprises two parallel inferential tracks (Figure 2): (1) a
medial track from the vmPFC to dmPFC arbitrating
between exploiting/adjusting the current task set driving
behavior vs. exploring/creating new task sets from long-
term memory. While the vmPFC infers the reliability of
the current actor task set in predicting action outcomes,
the dmPFC detects when this task set becomes unreliable
for inhibiting it and switching into exploration; (2) a
lateral track from the FPC to lPFC arbitrating between
exploring/learning new task sets vs. exploiting alternative
task sets recently used as actor. While the FPC infers the
reliability of these alternative task sets in predicting
current action outcomes, the lPFC detects when one
becomes reliable for retrieving it as actor. The lateral track
thus enables to avoid switching or perseverating in
exploration periods, when alternative behavioral strat-
egies are judged as applicable to the current situation.
Recent MRI-based anatomical studies [52,53,54] reveal
that the human FPC region considered here has no
equivalent in non-human primates, suggesting that thisCurrent Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2015, 1:101–106 adaptive faculty based on counterfactual inferences is
unique to humans.
Our review outlines a theoretical framework, whereby
simple choices primarily involve a ‘peripheral’ PFC sys-
tem including the lateral premotor and medial orbito-
frontal cortex. The latter drives the selection of motor
responses in direct association with stimuli and expected
rewards, respectively. The caudal lPFC has the capacity
to abstract multiple stimulus-response and response-out-
come associations into action sets. The caudal lPFC thus
enables to collectively select multiple associations
according to external cues and expected outcomes for
carrying out behavioral plans. Action sets are associated
with external situations perceived as featuring stable
contingencies over time and mentally instantiated as
discrete task sets. Task sets comprise action sets and
constitute a temporal abstraction level aiming at efficient
adaptive behavior in everyday environments where exter-
nal situations change and may reoccur periodically, and
new situations may always arise. Accordingly, the ventro-
medial, dorsomedial, mid-lateral and frontopolar PFC
form the core executive system inferring online the
possible changes of situations and arbitrating between
(1) adjusting and exploiting the current task set driving
ongoing behavior, (2) switching to alternative task sets
and (3) exploring/creating new ones.
Concluding remarks
The notion of exploration is central to the framework
outline here and consists of the deliberative, reversible
decision to create a new task set. In contrast to the online
reinforcement learning of task sets, task set creation is an
offline, computationally costly process resetting the actor
task set. The new actor task set is formed as the mixture
of task sets stored in long-term memory based on external
evidence according to task sets’ internal models of exter-
nal contingencies [35]. Interestingly, the offline creation
vs. online learning of task sets corresponds to the theor-
etical distinction between model-based and model-free
learning, respectively [34,56]. In model-based learning,
indeed, action values are inferred from internal models of
external contingencies while in model-free learning,
action values are learned by interacting with the envi-
ronment through reinforcement learning. A usual view is
that both model-based and model-free reinforcement
learning methods operate online concurrently, so that
the continuous mixture of model-based and model-free
action values drives behavior [34,56]. In the present view,
however, task set creation occurs at specific time points
when the actor task set that adjusts through reinforce-
ment learning is inferred as becoming unreliable (and the
alternative monitored task sets remain unreliable). Fol-
lowing its creation, the new actor task set is subsequently
adjusted through reinforcement learning, so that the task
sets driving behavior derives from intermittent, offline
model-based creation that progressively and increasinglywww.sciencedirect.com
Prefrontal executive control and decision-making Domenech and Koechlin 105incorporates online model-free learning. Both views
account for empirical data suggesting that adaptive beha-
vior forms a mixture of model-based and model-free
adaptive processes [55]. The two views however differ
in the way the two adaptive processes are combined over
time. Disentangling these two theoretical views and un-
derstanding how the brain builds new task sets from those
stored in long-term memory thus appear as central issues
for future research.
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